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Abstract—Data exfiltration attacks have led to huge data breaches. Recently, the Equifax attack affected 147M users and a third-party
library - Apache Struts - was alleged to be responsible for it. These attacks often exploit the fact that sensitive data are stored
unencrypted in process memory and can be accessed by any function executing within the same process, including untrusted third
party library functions. This paper presents StackVault, a kernel-based system to prevent sensitive stack-based data from being
accessed in an unauthorized manner by intra-process functions. Stack-based data includes data on stack as well as data pointed to by
pointer variables on stack. StackVault consists of three components: (1) a set of programming APIs to allow users to specify which data
needs to be protected, (2) a kernel module which uses unforgeable function identities to reliably carry out the sensitive data protection,
and (3) an LLVM compiler extension that enables transparent placement of stack protection operations. The StackVault system
automatically enforces stack protection through spatial and temporal access monitoring and control over both sensitive stack data and
untrusted functions. We implemented StackVault and evaluated it using a number of popular real-world applications, including gRPC.
The results show that StackVault is effective and efficient, incurring only up to 2.4% runtime overhead.
Index Terms—Security, Programming Language, Compiler
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1 INTRODUCTION
One of the central trust assumptions of software systems is that
a function can access data in the memory of another function in
the same process. By exploiting this trust assumption, malicious
functions can carry out "function-based data access attacks" to
access sensitive data in the memory of other functions, thus
compromising data security and enabling a channel for data
exfiltration attacks. Such sensitive data can include protected
health information (PHI) and sensitive personal information (SPI),
which are required to be protected by privacy regulations such as
GDPR [1] and HIPAA [2].
Function-based data access attacks can be enabled by
malicious code or security bugs in functions in the code-base.
Today, the use of third-party libraries and open source code
in software services and products is widespread, and this has
increased the use of untrusted functions included in application
code [42], [43]. Untrusted functions may not have been subject
to rigorous in-house software development and testing practices,
thus they could contain security bugs. Such security bugs
can be introduced from multiple sources. First, open source
code repositories have been demonstrated to be susceptible to
vulnerabilities [12], and an increased number of compromises
have been observed in the recent past [14]. This makes it possible
for security bugs to be introduced into open-source code with
malicious intent. Second, inadvertent programming errors can also
bring in such bugs. For example, Equifax recently blamed security
holes in Apache Struts to be the reason behind the 147 Million user
records data breach [13], [37]. In another example, Heartbleed
occurred due to a security bug (inadvertent or malicious in nature)
in the open source OpenSSL code [38], [50]. Third, the bugs
may also be injected by malicious inside members of a software
engineering team. Insiders may contribute new code or sabotage
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existing code in order to implant security bugs that allow access
to sensitive data in the memory of other functions, even when
there is no need-to-know [18] such data. It is reported that a Tesla
employee had changed parts of the company’s manufacturing
operating system code and sent "highly sensitive" company data
to outside parties [11].
There are several works on security of stack memory [16],
[21], [27], [48] as well as heap memory [32], [34], [40], [41],
[46]. They primarily focus on attacks based on corrupting the
contents of heap, or exposing/compromising the stack address
and corrupting the contents of stack memory. However, to the
best of our knowledge, data access isolation between functions
in the same process has not been addressed in the literature so
far. Shreds [22] and hardware architectures such as SGX [24]
and SecureBlue++ [19] protect from outside-in memory access by
external processes/threats; outside-in threat is outside of a process
and goal is to inject/read data in the memory of the process.
But "function-based data access attacks" enable inside-out threat,
where the threat is inside the process and attacker goal is to
exfiltrate data outside the process.
In this paper, we address the problem of how to protect
stack-based data from function-based data access attacks. Our
focus is to protect data on stacks and also the data in memory
pointed to by stack variables (we call these stack-based data
in this paper). Protecting the stack is a different problem from
protecting the heap because stack frames are allocated in a
systematic and managed manner and are transient by design. This
makes it possible to devise a more efficient solution for protecting
stack-based data compared to more general memory protection
solutions. Further, in the context of using third-party libraries, the
risk of data breaches and exfiltration can be significantly reduced
by protecting just the stack-based data.
Our contributions: We present the design, implementation and
experimental evaluation of our StackVault system that protects
stack-based sensitive data from untrusted functions. This system
provides the following guarantees: (1) while a sensitive function
is executing, the sensitive stack-based data of the function should
be preserved in a secure way (protection against corruption), and
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
03
71
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 Ju
l 2
01
9
2it should be protected from being read with malicious intent by
untrusted functions (protection against data leakage); (2) when
an untrusted function returns to its caller, the contents of its
stackframe are cleared in order to prevent the "untrusted" contents
to remain on stack of the thread/process, which can later be used to
carry out/enable attacks such as a multi-stage attack; (3) when an
untrusted function returns to a caller that is a sensitive function,
the contents of the sensitive function’s stackframe are restored;
(4) when a sensitive function returns to its caller, the contents
of its stackframe are cleared. StackVault is designed to support
sequential, nested and recursive function calls.
How StackVault works: StackVault introduces a notion of
"unforgeable function identity" and a kernel based mechanism
to protect the sensitive data on the stack. It consists of three
components: a set of programming APIs for users to specify what
needs to be protected in the source code, a compiler to compile
the source code with StackVault protection, and a kernel module
with StackVault related system calls to carry out data protection.
Our design of StackVault encourages a practice for more
efficient and cleaner secure programming; a developer should
manage the sensitive data on the stack instead of scattering the
sensitive data across memory by using both stacks and heaps,
which increases the attack surface. Using only heaps is not always
possible because function calls rely on stacks.
2 ATTACK AND THREAT MODEL
Function-based Data Access Attacks. The underlying assumption
in today’s programming models "trusts" that a function shall
enforce a "need-to-know" policy whenever it accesses the data in
the stack and heap of other functions in the code. However, with
proliferation of unauthorized/un-regulated open source code and
libraries, legacy software, as well as insider threats with access to
enterprise software supply chain, such an implicit trust assumption
may no longer be valid.
In a function-based data access attack, untrusted functions can
access and steal sensitive data from the stack-frames and in the
heap of other functions that have been called earlier during the
program execution. The vulnerability exploited by attackers is –
any function can access the stack or the heap of another function
in the same process. Such access is allowed in almost all processes
and is an implicit trust assumption in software systems.
Sensitive and Untrusted Functions. A function in a program
can be of the following two kinds – "untrusted function" and
"sensitive function"1.
• Untrusted function: an untrusted function can be any
function whose behavior is not fully controlled by a
user. Third party libraries are one category of untrusted
functions, since they are not fully written in-house and
can be compromised by being downloaded from a fake
website. In another example, when multiple companies are
contributing code to the same project, a function developed
by one company can be an untrusted function for another
company that is using the function.
• Sensitive function: a function that is fully developed
in-house and contains sensitive stack-based data, which
1. Trusted-not-sensitive function: for the sake of completeness, there is
another kind of function that is trusted but does not contain/process/produce
sensitive data. Such functions are not directly relevant to this paper, so we do
not discuss these kind of functions.
can be either a variable or parameter allocated on the stack,
or a pointer to heap data.
Example. C/C++ support pointers and pointer arithmetic that
can be used by f2() against its stack base pointer and get access
to f1(). Figure 1 displays the stack layout of two functions f1()
and f2() when they are invoked in either a sequential or a nested
manner. We assume that f1() is a function that has sensitive data on
its stack, while f2() is an untrusted function. In the nested case, the
untrusted function f2() is invoked within f1(). Since the sensitive
data of f1() still resides on its stack during the execution of f2(),
f2() can easily get these data if it is compromised. In the sequential
case, f1() allocates two pieces of sensitive data − password and
key − on its stack, but does not clear them before it returns. Thus,
when the untrusted function f2() starts to run, it will be able to
access these sensitive data on the stack of f1().
In our solution, we assume the OS kernel is trusted and has not
been compromised. Note that if an attacker has compromised the
kernel, StackVault may need to be implemented using a hardware
root of trust or as a complete hardware system (which is out of the
scope for this paper).
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
A system providing StackVault protection guarantees that all
previously allocated memory that has been specified as sensitive
will be inaccessible in the scope of an untrusted function. This goal
is achieved by assuming a trusted kernel and appropriately hiding
sensitive data in kernel buffers during execution of untrusted
functions.
Figure 2 provides an overview of StackVault, which consists
of three main components: a StackVault programming API, a
Linux kernel module, and an LLVM C/C++ compiler extension.
To protect an application with StackVault, programmers first
use the programming API to denote the sensitive and untrusted
functions in the application source code. Next, the source code is
compiled using a modified LLVM compiler, which automatically
injects StackVault system calls into the executable file. Then,
during execution of the application, these system calls invoke
the StackVault kernel module to protect sensitive stack-based
data. The following sections describe in detail each of the three
StackVault components.
3.1 StackVault Programming API
In our work, we rely on developers to explicitly specify untrusted
functions and sensitive functions with stack-based data to protect.
It is possible for an automatic or semi-automatic framework to
be developed for this purpose, e.g. by using formal methods,
analysis techniques, or heuristic rules. Such a framework is
complementary to our work and can leverage our system by
generating code with StackVault APIs appropriately inserted. The
StackVault programming API provides the capability to:
(1) Specify untrusted functions:
Untrusted functions are specified by listing the function prototypes
in a supplementary file called UntrustedList. The format is similar
to declaring functions in C/C++ header files. For an untrusted
third-party library, the header file defining the library functions
can be directly used as the supplementary file.
(2) Specify sensitive functions:
Sensitive functions contain sensitive data (or references to
sensitive data) in parameters or local variables. Like untrusted
3(a) Sequential: f2() is invoked after f1() (b) Nested: f2() is invoked within f1()
Figure 1. Function-based data access attacks in sequential or a nested function call.
Figure 2. StackVault system overview
functions, they are specified using a supplementary file called
SensitiveList. Alternatively, sensitive functions can be specified
by an attribute directive inserted directly in the code at the point
of the function definition, as follows:
__attribute((annotate(“StackVault_Sensitive”))) void foo(int x, . . . ){. . . }
By default, the entire stack frame of a sensitive
function is assumed to be a sensitive memory region.
However, the programmer can use the annotation string
StackVault_Sensitive_Finegrained to indicate that the entire stack
frame should not be protected.
(3) Annotate individual parameters and local variables:
For a sensitive function, any of its parameter or local
variable declarations can be prepended with an attribute
directive to allow fine-grained protection and access
control. For example, a single parameter in the stack
frame can be specified to be sensitive, as follows:
__attribute((annotate(“StackVault_Sensitive_Finegrained”))) void foo(
__attribute((annotate(“StackVault_Sensitive”))) int x, . . . ){. . . }
The attribute string StackVault_Sensitive specifies the
corresponding variable as a sensitive one to be protected
from being accessed in untrusted code, whereas the attribute
string StackVault_NotSensitive specifies the corresponding
variable as one that can be freely accessed. The attribute string
StackVault_WriteSensitive specifies a variable to be read-only in
untrusted code, which ensures that the value stored in the variable
will not be overwritten by untrusted function calls.
(4) Annotate pointer type parameters and local variables:
For a sensitive variable of pointer type, the address stored
in the pointer is protected. However, by default, the memory
pointed to by the pointer is not protected. The annotation string
StackVault_SensitivePointer is provided to indicate that both the
pointer and the memory object pointed to are sensitive. Likewise,
the annotation string StackVault_WriteSensitivePointer specifies
that both the pointer and the memory object are read-only in
untrusted code.
In some cases, the size of the memory object can be automatically
determined based on the type of the pointer. Otherwise, the user
has to explicitly provide the size, by appending it to the annotation
string in the format StackVault_SensitivePointer_x, where x is the
size of the memory object in bytes. This is useful for handling
void pointers and pointer-based arrays.
In our work, we handle protection for only one-level pointer-based
memory and assume that the memory objects are contiguous
blocks of memory. In general, memory objects can be recursive
pointer-based data structures, and there is ongoing work in the
community to investigate how shape descriptors for arbitrary
data structures can be efficiently specified [51]. However, for
all the applications we considered in the context of StackVault,
assuming one-level contiguous pointer objects is sufficient to
enable effective protection.
Figure 3 illustrates the use of the StackVault API with an
example code snippet. Figure 3(a) shows the original code where
pwdgenerator is a sensitive function, since it has sensitive data
such as passwd and id allocated on its stack. lib_func is a
third-party untrusted function which needs to access the age
variable on the stack frame of the sensitive function, but must not
be allowed to access any other data in that stack frame. Figure 3(b)
shows the modified code that uses the StackVault programming
API to enable this protection.
We defined the programming API such that it provides features
necessary to express all possible cases of protection requirements.
However, most of cases in practice only need to specify untrusted
functions and sensitive functions, and this can be done without
any changes in the source code.
3.2 StackVault Kernel Module
The StackVault kernel module provides a set of system calls to
specify what stack-based memory to protect and to determine
when to protect. Protection is guaranteed for an executable binary
generated with these system calls inserted at appropriate locations.
On loading an application binary, the kernel scans the text section
(using an ELF parser) to record the contiguous instruction address
span for each named function in the code. These instruction
address spans then serve as unforgeable function identities; i.e.
the kernel can ascertain whether a given program counter (PC)
register value during execution corresponds to the code of a
specific function or not, without the possibility of any function
41 /*pwdgenerator is a sensitive function*/
2 pwdgenerator(){
3 /*sensitive data on stack*/
4 char passwd[256];
5 /*stack pointer pointing to sensitive memory*/
6 char *id;
7 /*not sensitive data; accessed by lib_func*/
8 int age;
9 ...
10 id = malloc(len);
11 ...
12
13 /*lib_func is an untrusted function*/
14 lib_func(&age);
15 ...
16 }
(a) Original code
1 __attribute((annotate('StackVault_Sensitive')))
2 pwdgenerator(){
3
4 char passwd[256];
5 __attribute((annotate('StackVault_SensitivePointer_len')))
6 char *id;
7 __attribute((annotate('StackVault_NotSensitive')))
8 int age;
9 ...
10 id = malloc(len);
11 ...
12
13 /* add prototype of lib_func in UntrustedList */
14 lib_func(&age);
15 ...
16 }
(b) Code with StackVault API
Figure 3. Example code using StackVault protection
masquerading as another. These function identities are reliable
due to two reasons: first, the text sections in executable binaries
are read-only and cannot be dynamically modified, and second, the
value of PC registers cannot be modified by malicious user-level
code.
The kernel runtime maintains four data structures: a Function
identity mapping table, a RegisterList to record what is to be
protected, a ProtectList to record the sequence of the protected
calls, and a SaveBuffer to temporarily save sensitive data. These
data structures are only available to kernel code, and cannot be
accessed from user space.
The following system calls are used to specify what to protect:
(1) register_stack(bool all):
This call is to be invoked at the very beginning of each
sensitive function. The boolean parameter determines whether the
entire stack frame is to be protected. When invoked, this call
automatically determines the identity of the calling function based
on the current PC register value. It also determines the bounds
of the stack frame for the calling function based on the calling
convention (using rbp and rsp register values on x86 architecture).
It then creates a new entry in the RegisterList, and records the
function identity, address bounds of the stack frame, and the
boolean parameter value passed in.
(2) register_memory(char *base, unsigned long len, bool
readOnly):
This call is used to specify fine-grained regions of the stack frame
that are sensitive and to be protected. It is also used to protect the
memory object pointed to by a sensitive pointer variable on the
stack. When invoked, this call first verifies that the identity of the
calling function is the same as the function identity corresponding
to the last register_stack call recorded in the RegisterList. If it
does not match, an exception is flagged by the kernel, since a
different identity indicates an illegal invocation. Otherwise, the
kernel creates a new entry in the RegisterList, and records the
parameters passed in, which are the base address, length in bytes
of the memory region to be protected, and the type of protection
(read-only access, or full protection).
(3) register_memory_exception(char *base, unsigned long len,
bool readOnly):
This call is used to specify fine-grained regions of a sensitive stack
frame that must be accessible from within an untrusted function.
It is particularly useful when the address of a variable on the stack
of a sensitive function is passed as a parameter to the untrusted
function. As in the previous case, this call first verifies that the
identity of the calling function is the same as the last register_stack
call recorded in the RegisterList. It also verifies that the memory
region defined by base and len falls within the current stack frame.
If so, it creates a new entry in the RegisterList, and records the
parameters passed in.
(4) unregister_stack(void):
This call is to be invoked right before a sensitive function returns.
As in the previous case, this call first verifies that the identity of the
calling function is the same as the last register_stack call recorded
in the RegisterList. If so, it removes the RegisterList entry of the
last register_stack call and all subsequent entries to it as well. It
also clears the stack frame of the calling function, which ensures
that untrusted functions invoked later in execution will not be able
to access any leftover sensitive stack data.
The following system calls are used to determine when to
protect:
(1) start_protect(void):
This call is to be invoked right before an untrusted function call.
It enables protection for all registered sensitive memory regions
by copying the sensitive data to kernel buffers. It also clears
the sensitive memory regions (except when the memory region
is allowed read-only access) to ensure that sensitive data is not
leaked to untrusted functions. This call also determines the identity
of the calling function and creates a new entry in the ProtectList
recording the function identity and the index of the first free entry
in the RegisterList.
Note that in the case of nested calls to start_protect, protection
will already be in effect for sensitive data registered prior to
the previous start_protect call, and this invocation of start_protect
needs to process only the data newly registered since then. These
RegisterList entries are processed in order, and Algorithm 1 gives
details of how this is done.
(2) stop_protect(void):
This call is to be invoked right after an untrusted function call
returns. On invocation, it first determines the identity of the calling
function, and verifies that it is the same as the function identity
recorded in the last entry in the ProtectList. If the identities do not
match, an exception is flagged. Then it verifies that the index of
the first free entry in the RegisterList matches the index recorded
in the last entry in the ProtectList. If it does not match, then there
are improper (possibly malicious) entries in the RegisterList added
during execution of untrusted code, and an exception is flagged.
5Otherwise, the kernel removes the last ProtectList entry. Then it
uses the SaveBuffer to restore data for all sensitive memory
regions. This ensures that the application continues executing
correctly and remains unaffected by any corrupt data that may
have been written into sensitive areas by untrusted code. The
restoration of stack-based data is done by processing RegisterList
entries in order, analogous to the processing for start_protect
calls. This procedure assumes that for a given sensitive function,
there is no overlap between the memory objects referred
to by register_memory and register_memory_exception calls.
This constraint is automatically satisfied when the StackVault
programming API and compiler are used to generate the
executable code.
Algorithm 2 gives details of how the stack frame restoration is
done. Note that the pseudocode shown here gives the logic of the
algorithm; the actual implementation is optimized for the common
case. Also note that data written to SaveBuffer is read back exactly
once, and buffer management can free up the corresponding space
on a read.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for processing start_protect calls
1: if ProtectList is empty then
2: start← 0
3: else
4: start← index stored in last ProtectList entry
5: end← index of last entry in RegisterList
6: for i← start, end do
7: if RegisterList[i] is register_stack then
8: if all is true then
9: copy stack frame to SaveBuffer
10: else
11: copy memory object to SaveBuffer
12: for i← start, end do
13: case RegisterList[i] is register_stack :
14: if all is true then
15: clear stack frame
16: case RegisterList[i] is register_memory :
17: if readOnly is false then
18: clear memory object
19: case RegisterList[i] is register_memory_exception :
20: copy back memory object from SaveBuffer
Figure 4 shows the example of Figure 3 with appropriate
StackVault system calls inserted.
1 pwdgenerator(){
2 register_stack(all=True);
3 char passwd[256];
4 char *id;
5 int age;
6 ...
7 id = malloc(len);
8 ...
9 register_memory(id, len, False);
10 register_memory_exception(&age, sizeof(int), False);
11 start_protect();
12 lib_func(&age);
13 stop_protect();
14 ...
15 unregister_stack();
16 }
Figure 4. Example code with StackVault system calls
3.2.0.1 System Call Invocation in Assembly: Although
StackVault kernel runtime calls are designed as system calls, they
need to be invoked using inline assembly (__asm__ in C/C++) and
are identified by the system call number, instead of being invoked
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for processing stop_protect calls
1: var TempStack /*temp buffer used to assemble stack data*/
2: var StackAddr ← NULL
3: if ProtectList is empty then
4: start← 0
5: else
6: start← index stored in last ProtectList entry
7: end← index of last entry in RegisterList
8: for i← start, end do
9: case RegisterList[i] is register_stack :
10: if StackAddr is not NULL then
11: /* copy previous stack frame to orig location*/
12: [StackAddr]← TempStack
13: StackAddr ← RegisterList[i] stack address
14: /* copy current stack frame to temp location*/
15: if all is true then
16: [TempStack]← from SaveBuffer
17: else
18: [TempStack]← [StackAddr]
19: case RegisterList[i] is register_memory :
20: if memory object is on stack frame then
21: copy from SaveBuffer to TempStack
22: else
23: copy from SaveBuffer to its original location
24: case RegisterList[i] is register_memory_exception :
25: if memory object is on stack frame then
26: copy from original location to TempStack
27: if StackAddr is not NULL then
28: [StackAddr]← TempStack
directly using the system call names. This is because whenever
a StackVault system call is invoked, it refers to the instruction
pointer (saved PC register value) to determine the identity of the
function that issued the invocation, so that illegal invocations from
untrusted functions can be detected. However, when system calls
are invoked by their names, the instruction pointer obtained within
the system call will always point to the same address in kernel
code, regardless of the function invoking the system call. This is
because the name of the system call is a wrapper function, and the
real system call is invoked inside this wrapper. Therefore, if the
system call is invoked by its name, the StackVault system call will
not be able to determine the unforgeable identity of the function
that invokes the system call.
3.3 StackVault Compiler Extension
The StackVault compiler automatically transforms code annotated
with the StackVault programming API to executable binaries
with appropriate StackVault system calls inserted. We modified
the LLVM compiler release version 6.0.0 to implement this
functionality. This compiler provides new command-line options:
-qstackvault to enable the StackVault system, and -qstackvault_dir
to specify the directory path containing the SensitiveList and
UntrustedList files. When invoked, the compiler front-end
processes these files and registers the identities of sensitive and
untrusted functions.
Then, the code generation phase incorporates the following
changes for StackVault processing:
1) Function calls: If the function being invoked matches
the prototype of an untrusted function, then the compiler
inserts a start_protect system call after the code setting
up the function call (i.e. after the callee stack frame has
been allocated and argument values have been copied,
but before the jump to the callee function code). It also
inserts a stop_protect system call in the code generated
6Table 1
Mapping from StackVault API to system calls
API System Call(s) Parameter Comment
Untrusted function start_protect and stop_protect before and after call
Sensitive function register_stack and unregister_stack all=True begin and end of function
Sensitive_Finegrained function register_stack and unregister_stack all=False begin and end of function
Sensitive var register_memory readOnly=False only when all=False
NotSensitive var register_memory_exception readOnly=False only when all=True
WriteSensitive var register_memory readOnly=True only when all=False
WriteSensitive var register_memory_exception readOnly=True only when all=True
SensitivePointer var∗ register_memory readOnly=False for pointee object
WriteSensitivePointer var∗ register_memory readOnly=True for pointee object
∗The table row describes handling for the pointee object only. The pointer var is also handled in this API, using the same logic as for non-pointer variables.
to process the return, right before the jump back to
the caller code. Further, it checks all arguments of the
untrusted function to see if any is of pointer type and is
assigned the address of a local variable on the caller stack
frame. For any such argument, it treats the corresponding
local variable as StackVault_NotSensitive, and inserts a
register_memory_exception system call if needed.
2) Function definitions: If the function being generated
matches a sensitive function, then the compiler inserts
a register_stack system call at the end of the function
prologue, and an unregister_stack system call at the
beginning of the function epilogue.
3) Local stack variables: Function parameters and local
variables typically have space allocated to them on
the function stack frame. When processing them, the
compiler checks the parameter/variable definition to
see if there is any StackVault annotation attached.
If so, it inserts the appropriate register_memory or
register_memory_exception system calls at the end of the
function prologue.
Table 1 lists all the mappings from StackVault programming
APIs to StackVault system calls. For all sensitive and untrusted
functions, the compiler ensures that the function is not inlined.
This allows the runtime verification to properly determine the
function identity. Also, the -fno-omit-frame-pointer compiler flag
is used to make sure the frame pointer register is always set up, so
that the kernel runtime can properly determine the bounds of the
function stack frame on a register_stack call.
StackVault is compiled with link-time optimization enabled,
and all StackVault system calls inserted during compilation are
inlined.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show how the StackVault system design
makes it robust against adversarial manipulations that attackers
may try to use. At runtime, the StackVault kernel module tracks
corresponding pairs of register_stack and unregister_stack calls,
and pairs of start_protect and stop_protect calls. It ensures that
these calls are invoked in a legal and orderly manner by using
runtime verification checks and relying on unforgeable function
identities. Thus, even when an attacker is familiar with the
StackVault system calls, the design prevents evading or misusing
StackVault security protection.
First, the attacker may try to evade StackVault protection by
invoking stop_protect in untrusted functions to illegally restore
the protected stack and steal sensitive information from there.
StackVault defends against this attack by checking if the function
invoking stop_protect is the same as the function that most
recently invoked start_protect. If not, then this invocation will
raise an exception, and a warning will be given to alert users
that their code is under attack. Even if the attacker manages to
hijack the program control flow and branch to the execution of
the stop_protect call in the appropriate function, any return to
untrusted function code will require crossing another start_protect
call boundary, and the attack will fail.
The attacker may also try to evade protection by using
the register_memory_exception call in untrusted functions to
void protection for specific memory regions. StackVault defends
against this attack by checking if the memory region defined by
the parameters of a register_memory_exception falls within the
stack frame of the current function. As a result, this call can be
used by a function to enable access to its own stack frame only,
and it cannot affect any other (possibly sensitive) memory regions.
Second, the attacker may try to misuse StackVault protection
by invoking register_stack or register_memory in untrusted
functions to illegally restrict regular code from accessing memory
regions that they should have access to. StackVault detects such
misuse on return from untrusted functions, when stop_protect
is invoked and the runtime checks if the number of entries
in the kernel’s RegisterList is the same as it was when the
corresponding start_protect was invoked. This check detects any
improper RegisterList entries leftover from calls made in untrusted
functions, and flags a warning to the user.
Note that the function identity checking prevents misuse of
unregister_stack calls in untrusted functions. The unforgeable
function identities used in StackVault cannot be subverted by
a user level program and are a key component for enforcing
protection. StackVault makes effective use of the PC register (for
function identities) and stack register (for determining stack frame
boundaries) as defined in the architecture and system-level API.
StackVault also assumes a trusted kernel with privileged access to
some memory buffers, and a cooperating compiler that does not
inline any untrusted functions.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we first measure the overheads of StackVault by
comparing the overall execution time of different applications
while running with and without StackVault. Then, we zoom into
more detailed StackVault runtime statistics to break down the
overheads and investigate various factors that could have different
impact on the overheads. Finally, we evaluate how StackVault
affects the executable file size and the compilation time .
75.1 Experimental Setup
StackVault is evaluated using the following applications: gRPC,
xmlstream, fileupload, htmltidy, minizip, and miniunz. In each of
the applications, there is sensitive data allocated on the function
stack, while the third party library calls are invoked in the same
function. Therefore, such library calls could access the sensitive
data if not being protected. The following two scenarios are
compared in each case:
• Native. The application is compiled with original LLVM; thus
it is running without StackVault capabilities.
• StackVault. Given a list of sensitive and untrusted functions,
the application is compiled with the extended LLVM for
StackVault, and it is running with StackVault protections.
All the experiments are conducted on an Intel Xeon E5640
server with 16 2.67GHz CPUs, 32 GB memory, and 500GB disk
storage. Ubuntu 16.04 with Linux kernel 4.4.98 is used as the
operating system. All the reported results are averaged over 5 runs.
The details of each application used in the experiments are as
follows:
• gRPC [6]. gRPC is an open source remote procedure call
system initially developed at Google. It is widely used to
establish communications among different components in low
latency, highly scalable, distributed systems. In this paper, we
use a gRPC benchmark which runs 2 processes called QPS
workers that act as the gRPC client and server, as well as one
driver process that sets those workers up to run a specific test
scenario. The driver sends the configuration parameters to the
workers and reports the resulting statistics after the scenario is
complete.
• xmlstream [10]. This application uses the libcurl library to
download an XML file from a given URL, and then parses this
file via the streaming Expat parser. We run the xmlstream by
downloading a 1MB XML file and parsing it.
• fileupload [5]. This application uses the libcurl library to
upload a file to a given URL. We run the fileupload to upload a
64MB file from one local directory to another local one.
• htmltidy [7]. This application downloads an HTML document
using the libcurl library and parses the document using the
libtidy library. We run the htmltidy to download the html page
from www.google.com and parse it.
• minizip [9]. This application creates a compressed file from
a normal file or directory. We run the minizip to compress a
folder with 5 image files, which are in total 146MB.
• miniunz [8]. This application uncompresses a compressed file.
We run the miniunz to uncompresses the files compressed by
minizip.
Table 2 shows the names of sensitive functions and number of
untrusted functions in each application. The untrusted functions
are from the Third Party libraries listed in the last column of
the table. As discussed before, since the source code of such
third party libraries are usually not written by the developers of
the applications, these developers cannot have full control over
the behavior of the functions in such libraries. The sensitive
functions are the ones in the applications that have sensitive data
on the stack. In practice, it highly depends on the developers
of the applications to specifically define which data is sensitive.
Taking the gRPC benchmark for an example, the functions
RunClientBody() and RunServerBody() allocate sensitive data
ClientArgs and ServerArgs on the stack. At the same time, a gRPC
library call gpr_log() is frequently invoked by these two functions.
In order to prevent gpr_log() from illegally accessing the sensitive
data on the stack, RunClientBody() and RunServerBody() are
selected as sensitive functions, while gpr_log() is selected as one
of the untrusted functions. Similarly, main() in libcurl-fileupload
is selected as a sensitive function, since it allocates a sensitive
variable file_info on the stack, while also invoking many third
party library calls such as curl_easy_getinfo(), which should not
be allowed to access the file_info.
5.2 Execution time overhead
In this subsection, we examine StackVault’s impact on application
performance. We instrument applications with gettimeofday() to
obtain execution times in microseconds for each application in the
native case and the StackVault case respectively.
The normalized execution time of each application is displayed
in Figure 5. It shows that the execution time overhead is negligible
for all the applications. For example, compared with the Native
case, the execution time of fileupload increases 1.2% in the
StackVault case, while that of minizip and miniunz increases 0.5%
and 0.4% respectively. This indicates that even though additional
system calls need to be invoked by the application in order to
interact with StackVault, the overhead incurred by such system
calls is small.
We zoom into the overhead to understand where it comes
from and which part contributes most to such overhead. Basically,
the additional execution time consists of two parts: first, since
the application needs to invoke the StackVault specific system
calls, there is overhead in context switching between user space
and kernel space; the second part is the time spent inside each
StackVault related system call. Figure 6 displays the normalized
time spent on each component. We have two observations. First,
for some applications, compared with the time spent inside
the StackVault system calls, the context switch dominates the
overhead. For instance, in gRPC and fileupload, 99% and 95%
of the StackVault overhead is due to the context switch. Second,
the distribution between the context switch overhead and the
StackVault specific system calls overhead varies among different
applications. Comparing minizip and xmlstream, although the
context switch overhead exceeds the system call overhead for
both applications, the context switch occupies 97% of the total
overhead in minizip while it occupies 67% in htmltidy.
To explain such differences, we measure how frequently
StackVault system calls are invoked in each application, and the
results are displayed in Table 3. There are a few interesting
observations. First, xmlstream and htmltidy have the most
StackVault system calls. This is consistent with the results in
Figure 5, which show that xmlstream and htmltidy are the two
applications that incur the most execution time overhead - 1.9%
and 2.4% respectively. Second, most of the StackVault system
calls invoked by xmlstream and htmltidy are start_protect() and
stop_protect(). Recall that in Figure 6, xmlstream and htmltidy
are the two applications that have the highest percentage of
StackVault system call overhead; the overheads of start_protect()
and stop_protect() are higher than their context switch cost,
while that of the other StackVault system calls are less than
the context switch overhead. Therefore, the more these two calls
are invoked, the higher the system call overhead in terms of
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Application details
Application Category LoC sensitive funcs # of untrusted funcs Third Parties
gRPC Remote procedure call benchmark 6049
QpsWorker
RunClientBody
RunServerBody
2 gRPC
libcurl-xmlstream File parser 103 main 14 libcurl, expat
libcurl-fileupload File upload 41 main 6 libcurl
libcurl-htmltidy File parser 83 main 20 libcurl, libtidy
minizip File compression tool 520 main 3 zlib
miniunz File compression tool 671 main 3 zlib
Table 3
Number of each StackVault related system calls invoked by the applications
register
_stack()
unregister
_stack()
register_
memory()
register_
memory_
exception()
start_
protect()
stop_
protect() Total
Total stack-based memory
copied and cleared
in bytes
gRPC 3 3 0 0 23 23 52 26,960
xmlstream 1 1 0 1 112 121 245 29,200
fileupload 1 1 0 2 10 10 24 5,824
htmltidy 1 1 1 147 2,053 2,053 4,255 2,187,680
minizip 1 1 0 6 11 11 30 32,114
miniunz 1 1 0 1 7 7 17 16,528
Figure 5. Normalized execution time comparison. Figure 6. Normalized overhead breakdown - context switch v.s. StackVaultsystem call.
percentage. The results also indicate that on average, a context
swtich between the user application and a StackVault system call
takes 7 microseconds. In addition, the overhead of the system calls
themselves depends on many other factors. For example, a larger
stack size could bring more overhead since more data needs to be
copied between the user stack and the kernel buffer.
Figure 7. Normalized overhead breakdown - per StackVault system call.
We further divide the overhead of the StackVault system
calls into each function, and the results are shown in Figure
7. It can be observed that in most cases, start_protect() and
stop_protect() incur the most overhead among all the StackVault
specific system calls. These two system calls are the most
sophisticated ones among all the six. Both of them need to copy
data between the user stack and the kernel buffer, clear the user
stack or free the kernel buffer, and refer to the memory areas
registered by register_memory() and register_memory_exception()
to make sure these areas are properly handled. Since a
sensitive function can include multiple untrusted functions,
start_protect() and stop_protect() can be invoked many times
between a single pair of register_stack() and unregister_stack()
calls. For each application, stop_protect() incurs more overhead
than start_protect(). Also, unregister_stack() incurs slightly more
overhead than register_stack(). This is because unregister_stack()
needs to clear the stack memory to make sure a sensitive function
does not leave any sensitive data on the stack after it finishes
running.
5.3 Executable size overhead
We compared the sizes of executable files between the Native
case and the StackVault case. The results show that although
the StackVault specific system calls are automatically inserted
into the executable files when being compiled in the StackVault
case, we see very little overhead in the executable file size.
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Comparison of executable file size(bytes) between the Native case and
the StackVault case
Application Native StackVault Overhead
gRPC 37,281,600 37,282,936 0.03%
xmlstream 13,416 13,472 0.42%
fileupload 12,768 12,824 0.44%
htmltidy 13,584 13,640 0.41%
minizip 81,664 81,792 0.16%
miniunz 77,200 77,336 0.18%
This is because compared with the number of instructions in
the executable file, the number of inserted StackVault specific
system calls is relatively small, which is negligible in this set of
experiments.
Table 4 shows that the increased executable file size due to
StackVault is within 0.5%. Taking xmlstream for instance, with
StackVault its executable file size increases 0.42% from 13,416
bytes to 13,472 bytes. Since the number of inserted StackVault
system calls is small compared to the size of application code, the
larger the executable file is the less the relative overhead. This is
demonstrated by gRPC, where the overhead is only 0.03%.
5.4 Compilation time overhead
Figure 8 compares the compilation time of each application
between the Native and the StackVault cases. The compilation
overhead is significantly high (about 1.24 times longer) for the
smaller applications (xmlstream, fileupload, and htmltidy), but
it becomes much smaller for larger application sizes, taking
about 0.47, 0.17, and 0.22 times longer for gRPC, minizip, and
miniunz, respectively. The StackVault system calls are currently
implemented as a static library, and the compiler implementation
uses link-time optimization to inline these calls. This contributes
significant compilation overhead, which can be optimized away
by having the compiler directly generate the inline assembly
instructions for each StackVault system call.
Figure 8. Normalized compilation time comparison.
6 DISCUSSION
The StackVault design handles recursive and nested functions for
any ordering of sensitive and untrusted function calls. It also
handles untrusted functions that are part of dynamically loaded
libraries. If an untrusted function is invoked using a function
pointer, the StackVault implementation is currently constrained to
only handle them when the pointer can be resolved at compile time
or link time. However, in general it is possible to use runtime code
specialization to handle all calls invoked using function pointers.
Protection for multithreaded applications. In the presence
of multiple threads, each thread has its own stack, but a thread
can still access the stack-based data of another thread in the same
process [4]. A simple solution for the StackVault design to provide
protection from untrusted function calls across threads is to use
locks and priority queues to ensure that no new sensitive function
begins execution concurrently with the execution of an untrusted
function. This can be implemented with a guarantee of forward
progress as long as untrusted functions do not have blocking
dependencies on application code. This is a reasonable assumption
for untrusted functions that are third-party library functions
or reusable API calls. This simple solution for multithreaded
protection will add slight overhead to register_stack, start_protect,
and stop_protect calls. More sophisticated solutions that allow
higher application concurrency are possible, but have to be
balanced with the extra implementation overhead.
Vulnerabilities of other programming languages and
Systems. Although the current implementation of StackVault is
based on C and C++, the mechanism introduced by StackVault
can be applied to many other languages. Any programming model,
language or runtime that relies on the assumption that "a function
can access data in the memory of another function in the same
process" is vulnerable to function-based data access attacks. A
programming language is vulnerable to the function-based data
access attacks if it satisfies one of the following criteria:
• It allows an untrusted function to directly or indirectly
access the stack-based data of another function that has
been called earlier.
• It has a facility that allows functions written in C/C++
(languages that support pointers and pointer arithmetic) to
be invoked, even if the language itself does not support
pointers/pointer arithmetic (such as Java/Python).
• It supports debugging APIs and tools to access/read call
stack contents.
• It supports reflection that allows the program to introspect
itself during execution.
Figure 9 presents the types of programming languages and systems
that are vulnerable to function-based data access attacks.
There are other systems and programming paradigms that
can benefit from StackVault, e.g. the micro-service paradigm.
Micro-services support API calls, which are essentially function
invocations in the form of remote procedure calls (over REST,
SOAP). When such services receive parameters for the call, they
use stack-frames to manage such data. The micro-services widely
use third-party libraries in their implementation. Functions in
those libraries (untrusted functions) when called from the API
method implementation would allow these functions to access
client-supplied data on stack-frames and/or in heaps pointed to
by the stack-based variables.
7 RELATED WORK
Stack based attacks. Due to the highly predictable layout of the
stack memory, stack based attacks have existed for a long time, in
which the most common one is buffer overflow [20]. For example,
StackGuard [25] proposes two techniques to overcome the buffer
overflow vulnerability. One is putting a canary word right besides
each return address on the stack, so that the modification of the
return address can be detected by checking whether the canary
word has been changed. This idea has also been incorporated in
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Figure 9. Vulnerabilities of other programming languages and systems.
the GCC [3] compiler. The other technique takes advantage of the
debug registers to monitor the stack memory that stores the return
address and triggers an exception once any return address has been
rewritten. CRED [44] introduces a C range error detector, which
allows programs to access out-of-bounds addresses that do not
result in buffer overflows. Other stack protection approaches such
as ASLR [45] and StackArmor [21] use randomization to make
it difficult for the attackers to guess where the target stack frame
is. The shadow stack [27], [47] was invented to protect return
addresses on the stack from being tampered with. In this scheme,
a shadow stack is maintained in parallel with the original stack,
which is used to ensure the integrity of the address.
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) based approaches [15], [16],
[26], [52] are also designed to protect stack-based buffer
overflows. Such approaches first construct a Control-Flow Graph
(CFG) using source code analysis, binary analysis, or execution
profiling. Then, software execution will be dictated to follow the
CFG, so that a compromised execution path caused by buffer
overflow will be prevented. Also data leakages may happen via
uninitialized reads. In this case, an attacker can get the stack data
via reading uninitialized stack variables. [39] and [36] are two
recent efforts that solve this problem by explicitly initializing each
local variable after it is allocated on the stack.
Strackx et al. [48] show how stack overreads can be used to
carry out stack overflow attacks even in the presence of canaries
and ASLR. The paper also talks about how stack overreads
can also be used to override protections offered by memory
obfuscation [17] and instruction set randomization [33]. Kundu
and Bertino [35] presented how placement new in C++ can be
exploited for carrying out buffer overflow as well as function
pointer subterfuge attacks.
Memory data leakage. There is a long line of research
on preventing memory data leakage. For instance, Shreds [22]
protects the sensitive information in private memory by using the
memory domain features in ARM CPU and [49] explores the trust
issues in multithreaded applications such as MemCached. [31]
finds that DRAM can retain its data for several seconds after it
is powered off and removed from the motherboard and briefly
discusses several solutions to these attacks, such as changing the
architecture of the DRAM to make it lose state more quickly.
SWIPE [29], [30] takes advantage of static analysis to erase
the sensitive data at the earliest time. [23] presents a secure
deallocation strategy to reduce the life cycle of the sensitive
information in memory. Vanish [28] aims at creating self-destruct
data that can automatically vanish when it is no longer useful. All
of these efforts try to reduce the probability of data leakage by
reducing its lifetime. However, sensitive data can still be leaked
within its lifetime.
Hardware protection. SGX [24] hardware protects a portion
of an application and data processed from threats outside the SGX
enclave. SecureBlue++ [19] supports protection of a portion or
the entire application or VM and the associated data from threats
outside the application runtime. In contrast, the threat we are
addressing in this paper is inside-out, that is the data can be
accessed and exfiltrated from inside the application to outside.
In comparison, StackVault differs from the above mentioned
works in that it identifies and reduces the vulnerabilities for
stack-based attacks due to no isolation support among the
functions within the same process. Moreover, existing memory
isolation domains are at the process level, which are too coarse to
prevent in-process function level illegal memory access.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Untrusted third party libraries and malicious insider actors
are becoming a significant threat leading to data leakage and
exfiltration attacks. In this paper, we have described how
function-based data access attacks can be enabled by malicious
code in untrusted functions originating from such threats. We
presented the StackVault system to protect stack-based sensitive
data from being maliciously accessed by untrusted functions in
the same process. StackVault introduces a set of programmer
APIs, compiler extensions, and system calls that can be used to
protect sensitive data during execution of untrusted functions and
clear out the sensitive data from memory as soon as the sensitive
function returns. StackVault uses a novel notion of unforgeable
function identity in order to ensure that it will not be abused,
subverted or spoofed by malicious functions. We have provided a
security analysis and experimental evaluation of StackVault using
popular real world applications such as gRPC. The results show
that StackVault assures sufficient security guarantees while being
highly efficient – it incurs very low overhead on the execution time
of applications. StackVault can be used to enhance compliance
with GDPR and HIPAA by protecting sensitive personal and
healthcare data.
In the future, we are planning to develop schemes to protect the
contents of heaps from function-based data access attacks (heap
contents that are referred to by any stack variable are already
protected by StackVault as presented in this paper). Another
future direction is to evaluate different security solutions for
multi-threaded applications.
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